



December 13, 2021

R. Paul Barnes
Director, Atlantic Canada and Arctic
Canadian Association of Petroleum Producers (CAPP)
1004, 235 Water Street
St. John's, NL, A1C 1B6

Dear Mr. Barnes,

Re: Canadian Association of Petroleum Producers - OHS Submission

Thank you for submitting, on behalf of CAPP members, a collective response to the proposed *Canada-Newfoundland and Labrador Offshore Occupational Health and Safety (OHS) Regulations* published in *Canada Gazette*, Part I, on July 24th, 2021.

Please see attached summary of the comments and responses, which include some changes that were made to the proposed regulations, as well as some clarifications to questions submitted by CAPP members.

Government partners are available to meet for discussion regarding specific comments and responses if desired.

Stakeholder comments and other information on this initiative will be made available on the Natural Resources Canada webpage for the Atlantic Occupational Health and Safety Initiative: <https://www.nrcan.gc.ca/energy/offshore-oil-gas/18883>

Sincerely,

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Attachment: [Summary of CAPP Member CG1 Comments and Responses]

Summary of CAPP Member Comments and Responses

Summaries of the comments received from CAPP members are numbered below, each followed by a response from Natural Resources Canada (NRCAN) that includes clarifications and outcomes from discussions with the Governments of Newfoundland and Labrador and Nova Scotia, as well as technical advisors at the C-NLOPB and CNSOPB. References below to particular sections in the regulations correspond to the proposed regulation published in the *Canada Gazette*, Part I, on July 24th, 2021.

1. Policy disconnect between Framework regulations and Occupational Health and Safety (OHS) regulations

CAPP members: A statement on application is missing from the draft OHS regulations. This is a missed opportunity to develop OHS regulations that recognize installations with a Certificate of Fitness and installations that do not require a Certificate of Fitness. CAPP recommends that language similar to the Framework regulations be included in the preamble of the draft OHS regulation that provides clear guidance and applicability for installations with and without a valid CoF.

NRCAN response

The Act outlines in 205.003 the application of Part III.1 to “workplaces” in the offshore area, as well as to passengers in transit to/from/in-between those workplaces. The Act further defines “workplace” for the purpose of Part III.1, and can be found in 205.001. The definition includes all marine installations and structures (as also defined in that section). Part III.1 requirements apply to all workplaces, irrespective of whether they may be subject to a Certificate of Fitness under Part III. A Certificate of Fitness should not be interpreted as satisfying an operator’s/employer’s ongoing obligation to take all reasonable measures to protect the health and safety of personnel in the workplace, nor should its issuance be interpreted as meaning the requirements related to occupational health and safety in a workplace have been met.

The draft Framework regulations were provided for preliminary reference; the application provision in those draft regulations is under review and any unintended confusion will be resolved in the proposed Framework regulations, which is expected to be pre-published in the *Canada Gazette*, Part I, in early 2022.

2. Lack of recognition for risk based inspection programs

CAPP members: Concern expressed regarding lack of recognition for risk based inspection programs. Prescribed frequency of pressure equipment inspections has the potential to increase risk to personnel and equipment, including exposure to confined spaces, disruption of pressure containing connections, shut down and startup of equipment, etc. Recommend adding “...unless subject to a risk-based inspection and / or condition-based monitoring scheme approved by the CSO” as an alternative to the prescribed 1 and 5 year minimum inspections.

NRCAN response

NRCAN and its provincial partners believe there is scope for risk-based inspection and/or condition based monitoring schemes to exist within the regulatory framework, with minimum frequencies set by

regulation. Notwithstanding, the government partners considered the potential occupational health and safety hazard presented by boilers and pressure systems and concluded that the significant hazards related to employee potential exposure to hazardous energy and hazardous substances. These topics, as well as compressed gas, and their respective associated hazards, are addressed separately in the regulations.

Additionally, the Act obligates the operator and employer with ensuring that all equipment in the workplace, including boilers and pressure equipment, is safe for use and used as intended, and requires the operator and employer to take all reasonable measures to ensure the health and safety of employees and others in the workplace. Given this, the government partners concluded that the OHS concerns related to boilers and pressure vessels have already been addressed through these other obligations and regulatory requirements, and as such, the Part on boilers and pressure vessels has been removed from the proposed OHS regulations.

The proposed Framework regulations will address operational hazards of boilers and pressure systems.

3. Conformance with standards incorporated by reference

CAPP members: Section 90(1)(b) states that maintenance should be conducted in accordance with manufacturer's instructions but Section 90(1)(e)(ii) states a thorough safety inspection is to be conducted annually. These two statements contradict one another.

Proposed requirement for conformance to primarily Canadian standards (most of which were never written for offshore application), and the ability for Board Safety Officers to ask for such a demonstration, has the potential to add a substantial administrative burden to operators in the form of gap analyses with no tangible improvement to worker safety. CAPP recommends the addition of a provision for acceptance of the rules, codes, or standards acceptable to a recognized classification society and previously accepted as part of the Offshore Boards' regulatory query (RQ) process.

NRCan response

The proposed regulations prescribe requirements directly in the regulation and also through the incorporation by reference of technical standards and other documents. Incorporation by reference is used to make the content or text of the incorporated document a part of the regulation, regardless of its source and without the need to reproduce the language in the regulation itself. The legal effect of incorporation by reference is to list the incorporated document into the regulations, which are then considered part of the regulations.

Every document that is incorporated by reference in the proposed regulations has been reviewed and assessed for its appropriateness for the Can-NL and Can-NS offshore areas. NRCan and its partners have taken great care in ensuring that how the regulations incorporate the content of each document provides the necessary flexibility to allow equipment already on board to be used, provided it meets the minimum specifications laid out in the incorporated text. For example, many standards pertaining to PPE that have been incorporated by reference expressly exclude provisions related to marking, which would otherwise require the equipment to be marked/stamped to the specific standard

organization (e.g. CSA). This means equipment that meets the requirements detailed in the standard, but is not marked with the CSA logo, may still be used. Additionally, there are a number of areas where international maritime safety convention requirements and/or other international standards (e.g. EN, ISO) are incorporated by reference.

The Act provides occupational health and safety officers the powers necessary to verify compliance with the Act and the regulations. The regulated party is obligated to ensure that the Act and regulations are met; this necessarily means that equipment/machines/devices must be assessed against the legislative requirements to determine if it is compliant.

As with any legislative requirement, an occupational health and safety officer may ask the operator or employer, as the case may be, to demonstrate that what they are doing/using meets the legislative requirements.

Finally, Section 3 of the OHS regulations provides clarity for situations where there may be inconsistencies or conflict among provisions of the regulations, including those that incorporate documents by reference. In the event of inconsistency or conflict, the provision that imposes the most stringent requirement applies.

4. Prescriptive isolation of piping requirements

CAPP members: Section 147(3)(a)(ii) is very prescriptive and specifically calls out only two means of isolating piping on an installation. This is very restrictive, is neither feasible, nor practical, and does not align with industry best practice where the risks associated with physical and chemical properties of the fluid, gas, or other contents dictate the level of isolation that would be applied. Current installations would be unable to comply with the regulation during normal operations due to facility design to industry codes and standards that align with industry best practice isolation philosophies. In order to comply, installations would require more frequent process, equipment and installation shutdowns to facilitate both preventative and corrective maintenance. This requirement will lead to more shutdowns which could have a direct impact on worker safety.

NRCan response

The provisions related to isolation of piping containing hazardous energy or hazardous substances were revised to permit alternate means of isolation with controls for ensuring reliability. .

The provisions related to isolation of piping within confined spaces, however, remains unchanged due to the high risk associated with working in those spaces. The CSO may permit an alternative method for isolating piping within those confined spaces through an approved regulatory substitution.

5. Other feedback and clarifications on interpretations and expectations

Applicable Section in CG1	Summary of CAPP member feedback/recommendation	NRCan response
4	Requested clarity on if is it the "Operator" and "Employee" to be referred to in the Policy? Clarify if this is in respect to OHS "policy" or "program."	This section is talking about the operator's OHS policy. There may be references to employees in the policy, but it is the operator's duty to establish the OHS policy, see 205.011 of the Act.
5(2)(a)	Requested clarity what constitutes a change and what drives an audit under this section. The occupational health and safety system is under continuous improvement.	A change would be something that may affect the health and safety of persons in the workplace.
14(1)	14 days for an investigation report is difficult when workforce engagement is required, if equipment root cause failure analyses requires manufacturer or OEM investigation. Recommend 21 days.	14 days is what is required under the transitional OHS regulations and has been in effect since 2015. It is also consistent with other OHS regimes.
15(b)	It is impractical for all new arrivals to wear an immersion suit and enter a lifeboat immediately upon arrival. Some lifeboats are mounted at a steep angle which increases risk of injury if they are wearing a suit to enter. Also challenging from a Control of Work perspective, with lockout, isolation and permit requirements. Requested clarification if this is this required for visitors? (operator management, CNLOPB Safety Officer, etc.). How often must this be renewed?	Without delay means within the shortest time period possible after arriving at the workplace. Revisions to regulation include: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Removal of requirement to wear an immersion suit while getting into lifeboat for this training. Personnel will still get practice donning suits during drills. • Clarified what training is required for first time arrival at that particular workplace, and again if they are absent from the workplace for more than 6 months.
16	Does requirement for competent person consider computer based training or other alternative training delivery? Concern that <u>all</u> instruction given to carry out a particular task would require records to be maintained. Some instruction may be informally through videos, handbooks, safety meetings, without records.	Text includes "...and, <u>if applicable</u> , delivered by a competent person" which considers delivery of computer based training. The person <i>developing</i> the program content would still have to be competent.

<p>18(2)</p>	<p>The draft FORRI consultation allows for "reference to a number or title of a document that provides this description" versus including many documents within the Emergency Response Plan itself. Section 18 (2) could be read that each of the items listed must be in the same document. Recommend changing (2) "The emergency response plan must" to "The emergency response program must" These respective requirements should be consistent, aligned, and harmonized.</p>	<p>The purpose of the Emergency Response Plan in the OHS Regulations is to ensure that all personnel in the workplace have access to the information they need to respond safely to an emergency at the workplace that has the potential to impact their health and safety. The current wording in OHS does not restrict how the content of the plan is organized/formatted; however, the information does need to be readily available for all personnel to access/use.</p> <p>In this regard, the purpose and intent of the Emergency Response Plan (developed by the Employer with control over the workplace) is different from the Contingency Response Plan, required of the operator under the draft Framework regulations. Additionally, there is no conflict between the requirements for an 'emergency response program' under Part III.1 and for a 'contingency plan' under the draft Framework Regulations.</p>
<p>18(2)(m)(iv)</p>	<p>Not practical or feasible for <u>all</u> safety critical equipment to be shown on a drawing. Each installation has numerous safety critical systems made up of countless safety critical equipment. It is assumed that this reference is made to manual call point/deluge/ESD stations for the facility however this needs to be clarified. Even approved Fire control plans and LSA plans would not have this level of detail contained.</p>	<p>Section revised to clarify that the drawing would include the location of <i>manual</i> emergency shutdown and activation devices for all safety critical <i>systems</i>.</p>
<p>24</p>	<p>Doesn't "secondary" imply "backup" or "emergency" power supply? Does this introduce possibility misinterpretation that there should be both a main and secondary emergency electrical power supply? Clarification on 'secondary' requirement as it pertains to MODUs. Modern MODUs have main engines that double as emergency generators (not a separate emergency generator).</p>	<p>Provision revised to 'emergency power source' for better clarity.</p>

25(1)	Clarification requested for "other elevated part of a workplace" to ensure consistent interpretation.	A workplace location where someone may need assistance getting down in an emergency because there is only one usual means of escape that could be rendered unavailable. Section revised for clarity.
29	It can be implied that being ready, and within 500m, is meant for operations that involve working over the side. It could also be interpreted that there is always a risk of falling in the ocean when working on an offshore installation. Standby vessels are currently required to be within a 20 min of an installation when on standby. Request to clarify the intent. Suggest replacing prescriptive distance of '500 m' with 'close standby'. Recommend aligning the wording of this section with the Atl. Canada Standby Vessel Guideline.	This provision applies when there is a risk of falling into the ocean, such as work being carried out over the side of the workplace, not just the mere presence of being offshore. Guidelines are not statutory instruments, and all guidelines will need to be reviewed/updated to ensure they continue to be consistent with the Act and regulations.
30(2)	Donning of the abandonment suit is done in BST training and included in offshore orientation, and quarterly video demonstration refreshers. The requirement for all crew to don suits once every six months will increase risk of injury. Immersion suits are limited in sizing, and the feet can present a tripping hazard. With the exception of summer months where suits can be donned at the lifeboat station, the rest of the year will require personnel to walk longer distances and down stairs from temporary safe refuge stations to the lifeboats. Consider adding "if feasible" or "if environmental conditions allow" to (d) (i)	Provision currently does not prescribe where the suits must be donned.
30(3)	This is a new addition and would required an approval for already agreed upon practices (see CNLOPB Interpretation Note 11-01 "Supplementary Guidance". Note TC has since approved simulator training as an alternative to coxswains launching lifeboats, recognizing the additional risks of such activities.	Boards have advised that they expect that all such requests be in writing, and contain the necessary supporting information which may include, as applicable, review by/concurrences from the workplace committee, certifying authority, class society.

	Requested clarity on what type of approval process this will be under new OHS Regulations.	
32(1)(e)(ii)	For workplaces which have a designated medical response team, the list to be posted should be medic plus medical response team members. Medic would be first point of contact in a medical emergency and would call for support of medical response team if required. Other personnel with first aid training, who are not members of the medical response team, may provide first-aid if they are on-scene prior to arrival of medic or medical response team, but would not be contacted directly by the Installation Manager in an emergency. Clarification requested that posting of medic and medical response team members is acceptable.	Revised to clarify that the bridge (for vessels) or location of the offshore installation manager only requires the list of all medics who are present at the workplace — or, if no medic is required, of the first aiders who hold the highest level of first aid certificate among those at the workplace — as well as information on how and when they may be contacted and where they may be located.
32(1)(f)	Installations have a dedicated medical response team with advanced level first-aid training. Requiring Standard First Aid training instead of Emergency will result in additional training days for offshore personnel. What is the reasoning for this change?	<p>Policy intent, which was consulted on at various stages between 2016-2018, contemplated 'standard' first aid as a minimum.</p> <p>Standard first aid training provides a broader level of training more suitable to the offshore remote workplace. Having more people with greater first aid skills and knowledge has been proven to not only produce better outcomes in incidents but also in prevention. Not all workplaces have a medic or medical response team.</p> <p>Blended online and in-person learning programs are available and 1-day recertification option is also available for non-expired certificates.</p>
46(a)(i)(B)	Regarding emergency escape breathing devices, requested clarification on the addition of "or" at the end of (B). Does this now mean that it can conform to IMO or CSA?	Yes, they can conform to either.
46(c)	What is meant by workboat anti-exposure suits? Is this a reference to immersion suits? If so, wording should be changed	'Anti-exposure suits' are marine protective suits also known as 'constant wear suits. Anti-exposure suits are a key piece of life

	to state that as immersion suits are used in other sections of the regulation.	saving equipment contemplated under both SOLAS and Canada’s maritime safety legislation. They are designed for use constant wear by rescue boat crew. The suits have features that protect the wearer from hazardous marine conditions with the mobility they need to perform their work.
46(k)(ii)	Regarding the low air alarm requirement for pressure-demand self-contained breathing apparatus, why not reference the standard instead of specifying the one parameter? 33% is the same as current NFPA standard.	Government partners have intentionally refrained from incorporating by reference an entire standard when only one (or a few) elements could be more easily incorporated directly into the body of the regulation. This approach avoids the end-user from having to purchase a standard for only one line/paragraph.
49	Does this requirement apply to consumable personal protective equipment (PPE)? Such as PPE issued directly to individuals that is likely to last longer than a year? E.g. coveralls, boots, hard hats, hearing protection devices. It would not be practical for the employer to keep records on all PPE.	Records are required for consumable PPE if it has maintenance, repair work, modifications, testing or inspections completed on it. 90(1)(e) has qualifiers that limit the scope of what PPE would be subject to this requirement. PPE that requires a more comprehensive inspection or maintenance by a competent person, are usually items that are not disposable/consumable. Examples: HUEBA, respirator helmets, immersion suits, heli suits, etc.
50(2)	Clarification requested on definition of "position indicating devices" Given that the draft Framework makes reference to the TC Lifesaving Equipment Regulations and life raft equipment list this should be removed from OHS.	The term 'position indicating devices' was used to permit the use of newer technologies. In OHS, this provision is about what equipment the operator needs to ensure is available onboard a helicopter, for the health and safety of the passengers in transit. The Framework regulations do not attempt to apply the TC lifesaving equipment (which is marine based) to helicopters.
50(3)	Confirm standards referenced for Helicopter Transportation Suit system are valid. (Note this comment was later retracted)	Part 9 (Passengers in Transit) comes under the joint recommendation of the Minister of Transport. Officials within Transport Canada have been engaged accordingly.

52(1) & (2)	<p>No one uses swing ropes in the North Atlantic. Regulations should simply state that Swing Ropes are prohibited in the regulations versus making Operators add this to procedures.</p>	<p>The regulation making authority in the Act (205.124(1)(c)) relates to the operator's <i>procedures</i> for safe entry/exit, so that is why it is phrased as such.</p> <p>Section revised to clarify that procedures must not permit the use of swing ropes.</p>
58(3)	<p>Washrooms requirements should be addressed under Framework regulations. As written, this does not apply to OHS.</p>	<p>The Act provides clear authority under Part III.1 to write regulations related to sanitary and personal facilities. Additionally, the Act also provides clear authority under Part III.1 to write regulations related to heating and ventilation.</p>
74(2)	<p>Emergency lighting is considered a safety and environmental critical equipment and is maintained according to a performance standard. Our members have had reliable response from testing and most correctives are minor in nature. Monthly inspections will be laborious without enhancing safety, (approx. 1000 battery backed up fixtures on each asset). There is already redundancy in lighting systems. Inspection topic should add language to allow for risk based equipment strategies and performance standards. Recommend changing to "at least annually" to align with current practice.</p>	<p>Monthly is the minimum frequency for emergency lighting under other federal OHS regulations, and provincially in fire and building codes.</p>
78(1)	<p>There is no mechanism for exemption of limit (H₂S, current ACGIH TLV is 1 ppm) however there are several instances whereby the "suggested" TLV's selected by ACGIH have had exemptions issued against them. The Government of NL did so when the ACGIH changed the TLV for H₂S to 1ppm from 10ppm. Clarification required. There is also no exception clause noted within this section.</p> <p>Suggest exception clause be added to allow for industry best practice or other standard be used with justification or equivalent level of safety outlined.</p>	<p>The Government of NL advised that exemptions were granted initially for H₂S when there were issues with the capabilities of the testing instrumentation. Newer instrumentation in use is capable of measuring at levels required by ACGIH. Feedback from the Boards has indicated that there is limited experience of regulated parties being unable to meet, or being out of compliance with, the TLV thresholds for H₂S.</p>

86	<p>The majority of offshore facilities have rails in some areas that are 1500-1600mm above the working surface for additional safety reasons (e.g. on stairs to the helideck). Removing the word ‘top’ would allow for a third rail higher than the prescribed one. Recommend this be reworded as follows: “an operator may place additional higher rails as long as they do not impair the prescribed rails.”</p>	<p>Guard-rail requirements revised to permit the use of additional rails, while still maintaining the minimum level of safety previously proposed.</p>
88(3)	<p>Requiring fixed ladder access is not feasible inside smaller open top enclosures as many are not designed with fixed ladders installed. Many enclosures may not be designed or intended for regular access, however may be required to accessed for a particular maintenance issue. Suggest reverting back to previous language to include "where feasible, there is a fixed" Compliance to this section will be challenging if language is not reverted back.</p>	<p>Revised to include "if feasible".</p>
90(1)(e)(ii)	<p>Clarification requested. The term “thorough safety inspection” has been interpreted by the Board/CAs to date as invasive/intrusive maintenance techniques such as full equipment teardowns, unless approved otherwise. The concern is the ambiguity in those terms and what constitutes a “through safety inspection”.</p>	<p>The thorough annual inspection is not intended to be the same comprehensive inspection under 25(b) of the D&P regulations and future Framework regulations.</p>
94	<p>Recommend recognition of internationally accepted standards to minimize the requirement for RQs with every foreign vessel entering the region. This relates back to our concern with the number of gap assessments.</p>	<p>These provisions permits use of equipment that is certified to other standards, provided it conforms to the minimum requirements detailed in the standard that has been incorporated by reference into the regulations. Onus is always on the employer to ensure that the equipment they are using meets the regulatory requirements. Using equipment that comes certified to the referenced standard is one way to easily determine that it conforms, but employer can also review the equipment against the given standard to determine whether it conforms.</p>

95(1)	Clarification requested. Would fueling restrictions apply to enclosed systems? Such as when fuel is transferred to tanks via a fixed, hard piped system.	This would not apply to fixed hard pipe systems designed for that purpose.
95(2)(e)	Clarification requested on "continuously monitored" - is this during fueling or 24/7?	Continuously monitored during fueling; only when there is a transfer of the fuel.
104(1)(a)	Flare ladders on facilities are installed with underside angled at 65 degrees from ground but require fall protection and have restricted access. Recommend changing to incorporate existing facilities.	The Act provides the Chief Safety Officer with the power to grant a substitution where the applicant can demonstrate to the satisfaction of the CSO that safety would not be diminished. The Act empowers the CSO in this regard in recognition that the regulations may not be able to contemplate all scenarios, and allows unique circumstances to be considered.
104(1)(d)	Previous transitional OHS regulations allowed side rails that extend not less than <u>900 mm</u> above the landing or platform. Recommend changing from 1m to incorporate existing facilities	Revised to require side rails extend at least <u>90 cm</u> above the landing or platform.
104(1)(e)	Clarification requested. Some fixed Ladders have corrosion protective coating and textured paint on the rungs. Is this section referring to Belzona or similiar coatings?	Where Belzona is used <u>as intended</u> , for repair, it would be acceptable. It cannot be used if doing so hides a flaw that affects the ladder's integrity.
106	Clarification requested. Does this CSO approval for use apply to first use or every use? Would it be more appropriate for a Competent Person or the CA to approve use of the equipment?	First use.
110(e)	Clarification requested. Does this CSO approval for use apply to first use or every use? It would seem more relevant that the CA approves the usage. Should this be in the Safety Plan, or a procedure, or on a PTW?	First use.
112(3)	Clarification requested. This addition implies that regardless of whether the ladder has a protective cage, etc., whenever a person uses a ladder greater than 6 meters, a fall arrest system must be used. If fall arrest system is required for all ladders greater than 6 meters, this would likely result in significant costs to each operator. What if the ladder is in a restricted area or not accessible to personnel?	A fall arrest system is required as specified, but it does not need to be a lad-safe system. The exclusion for scaffold ladders has been removed.

	Are lad-safe systems required on all ladders greater than 6 meters as it excludes scaffold ladders where these systems cannot be installed? Otherwise there would be no reason to exclude scaffold ladders in this requirement.	
125(4)	The term "visual hazard" is not defined in this regulation or in related standards such as CAP 437. It may be better to use the phrase "physical hazard or visual distraction"	Visual hazards are more than just distractions; they can cause disorientation, degradation or completely block the pilot's ability to see.
135(4)	Weather can be too harsh to post items and teams will store permits in a weatherproof sleeve at the workface with the safety watch. Recommend changing to "available at the confined space work site" versus "posted at every entrance".	Language retained as is; the intent is to ensure that the information is displayed in a prominent place at the entrance.
136(1)(k)	Clarification requested. Does a confined space rescue team tabletop exercise meet the intent which is current practice? It may not be practical to simulate emergency rescue drills without increasing the risk to personnel on the Rescue Team. It is not practical to complete a confined space entry drill prior to any entry to a confined space. Please provide a definition of drill. We recommend the wording be updated to state that where feasible, any confined space being entered for the first time, or if there is a change to protocols, have a drill completed to prove the effectiveness of the rescue plan.	A drill is not a tabletop exercise. A drill involves physically executing/simulating the action to prove the effectiveness of the rescue plan.
137(2)(a)	Clarification requested. If a space has continuous gas monitoring set up via gas detectors and the space is unoccupied for lunch break, will a new gas test be required? This requirement does not appear to account for continuous monitoring. Text should note this applies for entry without respiratory protection. Suggest adding provision for continuous monitoring.	The provision regarding testing before occupancy has been revised for more clarity, and includes consideration of continuous monitoring.
142(1)	Permits are not required for approved welding shops. Suggest adding to this sentence "unless the Hot Work is performed in a safe work shop or location designated for that purpose.	No change to provision. Practice could be to leave the permit open/recurrent.

143(2)	It is not practical to require foreign flagged marine installations to conform with CSA welding standards. Suggest recognition of flag state or CA requirements. The reference to CSA could remain as long as there is language included that allows foreign flagged marine installations to meet flag state or CA requirements.	Compliance with this standard is 'to the extent feasible' for this reason. Compliance 'to the extent feasible' means you comply as much as possible, up to the point it is no longer feasible.
147(1)(d)	Requested clarification. Suggested wording removing the "unique" qualifiers for the ID and key: "marked with an identification number" and "opened with a corresponding key with controlled access"	Added 'only' for clarity; qualifiers are consistent with the standard. Clarity can be found in the Z460 standard, which the Regulations require the employer to ensure compliance with Z460 for the control of hazardous energy.
147(1)(f)(i-v)	Clarification requested that use of individual tags on individual locks is not mandatory for group lockout situations. The requirement implies that installation of tag or sign is mandatory with the installation of every lock installed by an individual worker. For group lockout situations, this practice does not appear to align with group lockout practices outlined in CSA Z460.	This requirement for the tag/sign is for the device; the process described is correct. One authorized person attaches it to the lockbox, not everyone with a lock on the device.
147(1)(k)	Suggested add "or performing functional or operating tests"	This is implied by the language as written.
157(1)(c)	If the intent of this regulation is to reduce RQs we recommend removing the specific 75 kg limit, or changing it to 200 kg unless otherwise authorized by the Chief Safety Officer. This is in line with existing RQs approved by the C-NLOPB.	This provision sets a necessary upper limit on a very hazardous product and maintains awareness for regulator if it does increase. The amount of 75 kg is consistent with storage limits described in the <i>Explosives Regulations</i> .
170(b)	Surface supplied Helium-Oxygen Diving technique is what appears to be recommended for prohibition. There are some decompression techniques which recommends Helium-Oxygen mixtures to be breathed in the treatment of decompression illness. This is applicable to breathing Helium-Oxygen as an illness treatment inside of a decompression chamber. There should be no prohibition of this technique.	Illness treatment is not considered 'diving', or a 'diving activity' to which the prohibition applies. The provision does not prohibit the use of helium-oxygen for the purposes of medical treatment.

175	Decision conflicts can/will arise when two supervisors are designated working at/during the same time frame.	Conflict resolution and protocols for disagreements between supervisors should be addressed by the employer in their internal processes.
176(3)(e)	The term "dive" should be reserved to describe the diver entering the water from the diving bell (in the case of saturation diving). Recommend changing to "no pressurization is scheduled to last more than 28 days".	Will be revised to read: "no pressurization is scheduled to last more than 28 days".
177(1)	Recommend adding "tools and equipment used, name of the stand-by diver, name of the dive tender, name of the dive supervisor, the type of decompression used, environmental and ocean conditions. Change D) to "the type and serial number of diving apparatus equipment.	Revised provision to add these additional details. Note that ocean conditions are included in environmental conditions.